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market economies. This greater wage-setting efficiency in the transition economies ap-
pears to be more the result of social and demographic characteristics of the labor force 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The transition in Central and Eastern Europe has had a major impact on labor markets. 
Wage setting has changed from centrally established wage rates to market determined 
ones; there have been large shifts in employment from agriculture and industry into ser-
vices; and relative wages for different skills and job categories have changed dramati-
cally. Given such major upheavals in the process of allocating labor and rewarding 
workers for their contributions to production, the numerous changes in employment and 
the resulting need to search for a new job that workers in these countries faced, and the 
perceived rigidities in their labor markets, a natural question to ask is how efficiently do 
transition economy labor markets function in the face of such major changes in em-
ployment and wages.
1 In this study, we use stochastic frontier wage functions to ana-
lyze the degree of wage inefficiency in the Czech and Polish labor markets in 1996 and 
2001 respectively, and we compare this level of inefficiency to that existing in a sample 
of mainly developed market economies. We find that wage efficiency in the Czech Re-
public is better than that in most of the more developed market economies, and Poland’s 
wage efficiency is palpably higher than that in all other countries in our sample, suggest-
ing that transition economy labor markets function better in terms of rewarding workers 
for their labor market attributes than do those of more developed market economies.  
Wage inefficiency is defined as the gap between a worker’s actual and potential 
wage, given his or her demographic and socio-economic characteristics.
2 It is thus a 
natural measure of the allocative efficiency of the labor market. Wage inefficiency may 
arise from causes such as incomplete labor market information, discrimination, a decen-
tralized wage setting system, the absence of trade unions, weak employers’ coordina-
tion, or an unregulated labor market.  
Inefficient job matches where workers accept wages below the maximum wage that 
they could earn given their skills and characteristics result in both lower incomes for 
individual workers as well as noisier signals for workers and firms regarding the state of 
the labor market. Thus, such inefficiency results in both a private welfare loss borne by 
those workers who accept a wage lower than the highest one available to them as well 
as a social welfare loss borne by all employers and all workers who consequently face 





                                                 
1 The debate on labor market rigidities in transition economies is unsettled. See Boeri (1997), 
Boeri and Garibaldi (2006), Feldmann (2004) and Sorm and Terrell (2000). 
2 The literature often refers to this phenomenon as “underpayment” or “a shortfall in wages.”  
Some researchers use “underemployment”; however, this term may be quite misleading (see 
Hofler and Murphy, 1992). 
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2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND ESTIMATION TECH-
NIQUE   
2.1 The Theory of the Underpayment of Labor 
In their seminal article on the application of a stochastic frontier wage function to meas-
ure the underpayment of workers in the United States, Hofler and Murphy (1992) used 
job-search theory to explain the systematic deviation between observed and potential 
wages. This theory suggests a number of reasons why workers may terminate their job 
search before finding the highest wage that their skills and personal characteristics 
could obtain. One obvious cause is imperfect information on the part of both workers 
and employers. While searching for a job, workers do not know the exact market rela-
tionship between their skills and the going wage rate, nor do they know which firms 
will pay the highest wages for their set of skills. Because collecting this information is 
costly and time consuming, job search theory predicts that workers who face a budget 
constraint and who discount future income relative to current income will adopt a reser-
vation wage that is below their notion of the maximum wage that they could earn and 
stop searching when they are offered this wage, which may occur before they discover 
the highest-paying job. Likewise, employers have imperfect information about potential 
hires. Employers face the same uncertainties and constraints, although their informa-
tion, discount rate over future profits and perception of the wage-skill nexus may differ 
from that of workers. Nevertheless, the literature suggests that the major cause of the 
underpayment of workers is uncertainty on the part of workers rather than uncertainty 
on the part of employers. In part this is due to the fact that employers are able to organ-
ize searches for workers to be simultaneous by considering a number of job candidates 
at one time, while the searches of workers tend to be more sequential.
3 
Second, wage inefficiency could reflect the wage setting process and the bargaining 
power of workers and employers. Wage efficiency is expected to be higher for more 
compressed wage distributions and lower for more dispersed wage distributions both 
because less wage dispersion leads to a better understanding of the wage-skill nexus by 
both firms and workers and because, with less dispersion, neither firms nor workers can 
use leverage to move too far from the norm in their offers or reservation wages. The em-
pirical literature supports the view that labor market institutions, most notably collective 
bargaining, often proxied by trade union density or coverage by collective agreements; 
                                                 
3 Polachek and Yoon (1987, 1996) modeled this worker-employer search under uncertainty for both par-
ties by means of a two-tiered stochastic wage frontier in which both employers and workers faced uncer-
tainty. In such a model each hire effectively splits the difference between the reservation wage and the 
maximum wage between the firm and the hired worker. However, Polachek and Xiang (2006, p.42) show 
that “incomplete employee information varies far more than incomplete employer information” and thus 
the latter may be ignored without a significant loss of accuracy and generality. Polachek and Robst 
(1998) compared frontier estimates of incomplete information to direct measures of workers’ knowledge 
and concluded that “stochastic frontier estimates provide a reasonable measure of a worker’s incomplete 
wage information” (p. 231).  
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centralized or coordinated wage setting; and laws on minimum wages and progressive 
taxation, all serve to reduce the dispersion of earnings and compress wage differentials 
(Freeman, 1998; Blau and Kahn, 1999, 2002; Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002; Cardoso and 
Portugal, 2003;). OECD (2004) reports high bivariate and multivariate association be-
tween union density, bargaining coverage, and centralization/coordination, on the one 
hand, and overall earnings inequality as measured by the 90-10 percentile ratio on the 
other. The study concludes that “there is consistent evidence that overall earnings dis-
persion is lower where union membership is higher and collective bargaining more en-
compassing and/or more centralized/co-ordinated. This finding accords with a consider-
able number of earlier studies (…) and can be considered to be quite well established” 
(pp. 160-161).
4 
Finally, as Hofler and Murphy (1992) show, the degree of underpayment can be in-
fluenced by the characteristics of the labor force, including worker wealth and educa-
tion, labor force attachment, gender, etc. Thus two countries with identical institutions 
for wage setting and information about the relationship between wages and skills could 
have different degrees of underpayment if the composition or characteristics of their 
labor forces differ. 
 
 
2.2 The Stochastic Frontier Approach to Labor Market Inefficiency 
We utilize a stochastic wage frontier approach to measuring underpayment or labor 
marker inefficiency that is similar to that of Hofler and Murphy (1992). The stochastic 
wage frontier of the maximum wages that workers can achieve is based on a Mincerian 
(Mincer, 1974) earnings function of the form: 
  i i i w ε α + ′ + = x β ln    (1) 
where   is the logarithm of the observed wage of the i-th individual,  is a vector of 
socio-economic characteristics of that individual, 
i w ln i x
i ε  is an error term, and α and β s are 
parameters to be estimated.  
Following Aigner et al. (1977) , we separate the error term in Equation 1 into two 
parts, a white noise variable  ~  and a non-negative inefficiency term  . 
Equation 1 can thus be rewritten as: 
i v ) , 0 (
2
v N σ 0 ≥ i u
  i i i i i i i u v u v w w − + ′ + = − + = x β α max ln ln    (2) 
where w max i  is the deterministic frontier wage, the maximum wage that worker i  can 
obtain given his or her characteristics.   We assume a half-normal distribution for 
                                                 
4 Of course this wage dispersion is not necessarily the result of inefficient wage setting. Rather, the cau-
sality runs from greater wage dispersion to larger differences in wage offers that searching workers may 
receive and to a less precise understanding of the wage-skill relationship. 
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i u ~)  and that   and the independent variables are unrelated. Equation 2 is 
estimated using the log-likelihood function (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and van den 






i u i ε  is calculated as in 
Jondrow et al. (1982). The  -values are used to calculate individual efficiency (EFF) 
and inefficiency (INEFF) ratios measuring the gap between the actual wage and the 
stochastic wage frontier for the i-th individual as: 
i u
  ) exp( 1
) exp(
) exp(
1 EFF 1 INEFF i i i
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3 DATA 
One part of our data consists of estimates by Polachek and Xiang (2006) of wage-
setting inefficiency in 10 OECD countries including one transition economy, the Czech 
Republic, and Israel for years close to 2000. Because this sample includes only one 
transition economy, we supplement these results with out own estimate of a frontier 
wage function,  using data from the Polish Labor Force Survey conducted by the Polish 
Central Statistical Office in May 2001. We restricted our attention to full-time hired 
workers because only this category of employees was required to report their net earn-
ings at their main workplace during the preceding month. After these adjustments, we 
had a sample of 9,380 full-time hired workers for 2001. 
 
 
4 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
4.1 Estimates of the Stochastic Wage Frontier 
A problem that we encounter if we wish to make cross-country comparisons of the inef-
ficiency of the wage-setting process is that the degree of inefficiency measured by the 
frontier wage function depends in part on which and how many explanatory variables 
are included in Equation 2. Polachek and Xiang (2006) used the following identical 
explanatory variables to measure wage-setting inefficiency their sample of countries: 
years of schooling, years of potential experience, years of potential experience squared 
and a dummy variable equal to one if the worker is a woman. Thus, we used the identi-
cal specification for the estimate of the Polish wage frontier. 
The means for these explanatory variables, the maximum likelihood estimates of the 
parameters of Equation 2, and the estimate of inefficiency for Poland are presented in 
Table 1. Also reported in Table 1 are the corresponding means, parameter estimates, 
and inefficiency estimates obtained by Polachek and Xiang (2006) for the Czech Re-
public, Israel and a sample of developed market economies. As the first three columns 
of Table 1 show, the means of the explanatory variables for the Czech Republic and 
Poland all fall within the range of values reported for the non-transition countries with 
the exception of the percentage of women, which, in the Polish sample, is somewhat 
lower than it is for the non-transition economies. Thus, any differences in efficiency 
between the transition economies and the rest of the sample cannot be attributed to in-
ter-country differences in the labor force characteristics used to estimate the wage fron-
tier. 
The estimated frontier coefficients for Poland are all significant at quite robust p-
value levels and entirely consistent with those obtained by Polachek and Xiang. More-
over, all the parameter estimates for the Czech Republic and Poland fall within the 
range of coefficients reported for the non-transition economies. 
Despite the similarities in sample characteristics and parameter estimates across the 
countries in the sample, the efficiencies of the two transition economies are surprisingly 
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high. That of the Czech Republic is higher than that of any country in the sample save 
Poland and the UK, while Poland’s efficiency is higher than that of the other countries 
in the sample by a surprisingly wide margin. Given the major changes in the Czech and 
Polish labor markets that occurred in the 1990s such low labor-market inefficiency is 
noteworthy, and we now turn to an explanation of this result.
5 
                                                 
5 To test for the robustness of the low estimate of Polish labor market inefficiency, we estimated ineffi-
ciency for other years and we also estimated the wage frontier with a richer set of explanatory variables 
(worker characteristics). The low inefficiency reported in Table 1 was found for other years and for a 
richer specification.  
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5 WHY ARE TRANSITION ECONOMIES’ LABOR MARKETS  
SO EFFICIENT? 
In Section 2, we discussed the two major determinants of wage inefficiency: incomplete 
worker information and the wage setting process as the two determinants of labor mar-
ket efficiency. In this section we examine whether either of these determinants can ac-
count for the high efficiency of the wage search process the transition economies. Be-
cause both incomplete worker information and the wage setting process have a number 
of separate dimensions to them while we have a very limited sample of countries, we 
are not able to study the causes of labor market efficiency by means of regression tech-
niques. However, simple bilateral relationships between elements of labor marker in-
formation and the wage setting process provide useful insights into why the transition 
economies’ labor markets are so efficient. 
 
 
5.1 Labor Market Information 
Job search theory predicts that better labor market information improves the job-
matching process, leads to higher wage offers and lowers underpayment. However, la-
bor market information is imperfect and costly to obtain. Theory predicts that certain 
demographic groups possess more or better information than others, that some methods 
for collecting information are more efficient and lead to more and better information 
than do others, and that the availability of supplementary income lowers search costs, 
prolongs the period of job search, and allows workers to acquire more information.  
Socio-demographic groups and labor market information. Weak labor market at-
tachment, an environment with limited public knowledge about wages, higher costs of 
job search, etc. lead to less complete information and, consequently, to higher wage 
inefficiency. Search theory suggests that men, married workers, prime age workers, 
workers with more education, workers in urban areas, union members, industrial work-
ers, public sector workers, and natives experience less underpayment as compared to 
women, single workers, young workers, less educated workers, workers in rural areas, 
non-unionized workers, private sector workers, and migrants.
6 Data on these character-
istics of each sample country’s labor force are reported in Table 2 and plotted against 
the estimate of labor market efficiency of each country in Figure 1. Overall, the results 
presented in Figure 1 are in accord with the predictions of search theory in that a coun-
try’s wage efficiency is positively correlated with demographic characteristics of the 
labor force such as the share of male, married, prime-age, higher-educated, industrial, 
                                                 
6 Meager et al. (2002) examined workers’ awareness and knowledge of five specific groups of employ-
ment rights: legislation related to work-life balance; working time legislation; wages, terms and condi-
tions (including the national minimum wage); anti-discrimination legislation; and unfair dismissal rights. 
Their results conclude that worker characteristics are associated with different levels of aware-
ness/knowledge. 
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and native workers in the labor force. The exception is urbanization, which appears to 
be unrelated or negatively related to wage efficiency.  
Panel a of Figure 1 shows a positive relationship between efficiency and the percent-
age of males in civilian employment. Indeed, if Ireland, a clear outlier, were dropped 
from the sample, this relationship would be particularly tight, and Poland and the Czech 
Republic both have relatively high percentages of male workers in civilian employment. 
In Panel b a high share of married people in the adult population 20 to 40 years of age 
also shows a positive influence on efficiency. In our sample Poland, at 57.7 percent, and 
the Czech Republic have the highest shares and Sweden the lowest at 28.0 percent.
7  
Considerable research in labor economics suggests that family interests make workers 
perform better in the labor market along several dimensions. Especially for men, mar-
riage is likely to be a powerful source of pressure to get a good job and settle down. 
Married workers are believed to have greater motivation from the need to support their 
families, so they are more apt to search for jobs that pay well and to have a higher res-
ervation wage then unmarried workers. On the other hand, companies search for work-
ers whose need to earn more makes them more productive and committed at the work-
place. Thus married workers have both a higher reservation wage and a higher likeli-
hood of being offered a wage close to the frontier.
8 We conclude that a greater share of 
married people in the Polish and Czech work forces thus contributes to a higher level of 
wage efficiency in these countries.  
Panel c plots the share of prime-age (25-55 years of age) workers in employment 
against efficiency. Poland has the highest share at 81.5 percent and the Czech Republic 
scores relatively high as well. The weak labor market attachment of younger and older 
workers is a well-established fact. EU-OSHA (2007) analyzed youth employment in the 
EU-25 and concluded that:  
“[t]emporary workers (…) are less informed” and that “[i]n 2005, one in four young 
workers had a part-time job.” (p. 1). 
Older workers also have weak labor force attachment. OECD (2006) reviewed 21 
OECD countries and found that:  
 “In 2004, less than 60% of the population aged 50-64 had a job, on average in the 
OECD, compared with 76% for the age group 24-49” (pp. 9-10) and that older workers 
who lose their job often face considerable difficulties finding a new job and suffer large 
potential wage losses.  “In most of the review countries, older people appear to face a 
number of obstacles in obtaining adequate employment services to help them find a job. 
(…) Moreover, the level and type of support given to older jobseekers is not always the 
same as is given to younger jobseekers” (pp.76-77), and “[o]lder job seekers are under-
represented in active labour market programmes in nearly all of the review countries” 
(p. 10).
9 
                                                 
7 Poland also has the highest share of married people in the 20-40 age group among the 20 OECD coun-
tries. 
8 Research shows that being married consistently has a statistically significant positive effect on men’s 
earnings. For women, the relationship between marriage and earnings is more complex: the findings 
range from slightly positive to negative.  
9 OECD (2006) reports that older workers in several countries are much less likely than the young to be 
covered by active labor-market policies. Hence, public employment services need to provide tailored help 
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Weak labor market attachment of younger and older workers leads to their having 
poor labor market information. According to Meager (2002, p. 32), “levels of informed 
awareness (…) peak in the 36-45 age group, with those in the youngest and oldest 
groups the least informed.” The fact that in our sample Poland has the lowest share of 
younger and older workers while the Czech Republic is also below average for our sam-
ple means that they have high shares of prime-age workers who possess more informa-
tion and hence experience greater wage efficiency. 
Panel d of figure 1 shows that Poland and the Czech Republic do not differ much 
from the other countries in the sample, except for Ireland, which is something of an out-
lier here as well, in terms of the share of workers with secondary and tertiary education 
in the work force. The literature suggests that better educated workers are also better 
informed about wages and job opportunities, and, if Ireland is dropped from the picture, 
there is a strong relationship between educational attainment and wage efficiency in our 
sample. However, given that the educational attainment of Czech and Polish workers 
falls in the mid-range of the sample countries, this demographic characteristic does not 
help explain the greater wage efficiency in the two transition economies.  
Finally, a low share of foreign-born population (i.e., immigrants) tends to reduce ob-
served wage efficiency, and this is borne out by Panel e of Figure 1, although the cross-
country variation is quite large. Poland has the lowest proportion of foreign born and 
the Czech Republic, too, has a low proportion of the foreign born, in both countries a 
legacy of their communist past. In many countries, migrants do not integrate well into 
the labor market, and overqualification for the jobs they are able to get is a big chal-
lenge (Gurria, 2008). For instance, in the OECD countries the employment rate was on 
average 68.1 percent among the native-born population 15-64 years of age and 57.2 
percent among immigrants in the same age category. Overall, in the OECD, unemploy-
ment among immigrants was higher than that among the native-born: 7.8 vs 11.7 per-
cent, respectively. Furthermore, in almost all OECD countries, immigrants were more 
likely to be ‘overqualified’, that is, working in jobs or occupations for which their skills 
were too high, than were persons born in the country. Data in OECD (2008, p. 139, A 
profile) show that the percentage of employed foreign-born holding a job for which they 
were overqualified was 9.0 in Poland, 9.6 in the Czech Republic, 17.3 in the United 
States, 18.4 in the United Kingdom, 18.6 in Sweden, 21.0 in Ireland, 21.6 in Finland, 
25.2 in Canada. Unfavorable labor market outcomes of immigrants may be due to poor 
information about the local labor market, lack of host-country language proficiency, 
legal and administrative obstacles, and problems with transferability of human and so-
cial capital. As a result, immigrants may be more willing to accept unskilled jobs with 
low pay, even if their qualifications are higher. Hence, we may expect lower wage effi-
ciency in those countries where the share of immigrants is high. Since the Czech Re-
public’s and Poland’s shares of immigrants are negligible and the labor market out-
                                                                                                                                               
to the over 50s. Several pilot initiatives have been launched, such as “Jobwise Workshops for older job-
seekers and workers to provide them with information on the changing nature of the labor market (in-
cluding their own local labor markets), effective job-search strategies and available assistance measures. 
Jobwise Self-Help Groups for older job seekers, allowing them to exchange experiences, provide mutual 
support, develop their job-search techniques and improve career decisions.” (p. 129). 
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comes for them are more favorable than they are in other OECD countries, this, too, 
suggests a part of the explanation for the two transition economies’ high wage effi-
ciency.  
Environmental factors and labor market information. He ability of workers to ob-
tain information about wages may also depend on where they live and work, since the 
dissemination of wage information is, in large part, a social process. In Figure 2 we con-
sider some indicators that relate to social factors that may promote or inhibit the spread 
of wage information. In Panel a of Figure 2 we consider the degree of urbanization. The 
assumption here is that if workers are located in urban agglomerations, they have more 
contact with workers employed by other firms and thus more information about wages 
in the local economy than do workers in a rural area where the majority of them may 
work for a single firm that dominates the local labor market. Unfortunately, Panel a 
shows that, for our sample of countries, this hypothesis lacks support.  
Panel b of Figure 2 considers internal inter-regional migration. Like international 
migrants, internal migrants usually possess limited and incomplete information about 
local labor market conditions. As Table 2 shows, in Poland only 0.3 percent of popula-
tion 15 to 64 years of age moved to another region within a year, the lowest level in our 
sample, and the Czech Republic has the second lowest level.
10 Not only were transition 
economies’ internal migration rates low, but they decreased over the 1990s (Fidrmuc, 
2004). Feldmann (2004) attributes the low rates of inter-regional migration in the transi-
tion countries to the legacy of central planning and its pervasive job security, to scarce 
housing and undeveloped housing markets, a higher share of the labor force in agricul-
ture, low regional wage dispersion, and to the attitudes and habits of people. He sug-
gests that “the reason for this attitude is the traditionally very close system of family 
ties. In fact, surveys in Poland have shown that people move, if at all, for family reasons 
in most cases and not because of jobs” (p. 284).  Since permanent residents are usually 
better informed about the local labor market than new residents, low internal regional 
mobility supports higher wage, and this is borne out by Panel b. 
Panel c considers the share of the labor force engaged in industry on the assumption 
that industrial jobs are relatively homogeneous and that wage information spreads more 
easily in large industrial plants. An examination of Panel c lends some support to this 
hypothesis, but the relationship seems largely driven by outlier countries, and the dis-
persion around the trend line is quite large, suggesting that this is not an important fac-
tor in the transition economies’ good wage efficiency performance 
Finally, in Panel d we consider the size of the public sector. A high degree of public 
ownership is a defining feature of the transition economies. Public sector workers are 
often assumed to be better informed than their private sector counterparts about labor 
laws, wages, incentives, work requirements and conditions. In many countries, what a 
public employee makes is, by law, a matter of public record. On the other hand, a pri-
vate company is typically able to keep that information within the company, and could 
require employees not to reveal it to outsiders.
11 Hence, we expect that countries with a 
                                                 
10 We were unable to find comparable data for Finland, Ireland, Norway, and Sweden.  
11 For instance, Groot and Oosterbeek (1994, p. 388) conclude that “employees in the public sector pos-
sess more market information than workers in the private sector. This is probably due to the fact that 
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greater share of public sector employment will exhibit a greater degree of wage effi-
ciency, and the data presented in Panel d of Figure 2 confirm these expectations.
12 As is 
to be expected, the transition economies have a larger public sector despite the exten-
sive privatization that took place in the 1990s, and this appears to play a role in wage 
efficiency  
Job search channels and search costs. The job search of individuals in the labor 
market involves a number ways of obtaining information about available jobs. These are 
usually divided into three categories: institutional intermediaries such as employment 
agencies, market methods such as direct applications and responding to job advertizing, 
and social networks including family, social and professional links. The former two 
ways of searching for a job are considered as formal, and the latter one, informal. Job 
search methods vary in their costs, effectiveness, and access to different wage distribu-
tions. The time and money costs associated with informal job search are low in com-
parison to the costs associated with formal methods. Montgomery (1991), Mortensen 
and Vishwanath (1993, 1994) developed theoretical models of job search and argued 
that informal search methods generate job offers with higher wages; that is, even if ap-
plicants have the same productivity, individuals who have access to informal search 
channels will earn a higher wage. Studies have consistently found that informal meth-
ods may be as, or more, productive in generating job offers as formal methods. How-
ever, empirical studies addressing the extent to which different channels result in jobs 
with different wages yield conflicting results.
13 
Figure 3 plots the percentage of people obtaining information about jobs from infor-
mal sources such as family and friends in eight OECD countries in our sample. There is 
a positive relationship between reliance on informal search and the wage efficiency.
14 In 
Poland, those who rely on informal networks amounted to 46 percent
15, which is similar 
                                                                                                                                               
wage policies in the private sector are in general less public knowledge and more individually based.” 
Furthermore, Groot and Oosterbeek find that “public sector employers are more informed than private 
sector employers. By its size the public sector often exercises some sort of monopsony power on the 
labor market, leading to information advantages over employers in the private sector. When we view the 
public sector as one large employer, one may expect public employer ignorance to be lower than private 
employer ignorance, as a large employer probably has more information about the reservation wages of 
employees than a small-scale employer does” (p. 388). 
12 To assess the size of the public sector in our sample of countries, we used an internationally compara-
ble set of the OECD Product Market Regulation indicators (see Nicoletti et al., 1999; Conway et al., 
2005). The “public ownership” indicator is made up of: (a) the scope of the public enterprise sector, (b) 
the size of public enterprise sector, and (c) the extent direct government control over business enterprises. 
The methodology and results are available from the authors upon request. 
13 For example, Granovetter (1974), Corcoran et al. (1980), Simon and Warner (1992), Addison and 
Portugal (2002), Boheim and Taylor (2002), Sabatier (2002), and Kugler (2003) found positive (albeit 
sometimes insignificant) wage premia for jobs found through referrals from relatives and friends. In con-
trast, Koning et al. (1997) conclude that formal and informal search methods do not generate wage offers 
that are significantly different. Bentolila et al. (2004) find that the use of social contacts helps find jobs 
one to two months sooner but leads to individual wage discounts of 5 to 7 percent. 
14 Data on Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden are not available. 
15 Our own calculations for 38,954 Polish individuals who were unemployed in 1994-2001 also show that 
42 percent used social networks, which is consistent with the data in Paci et al. (2007). Further, 77 per-
cent were looking for a job through institutional intermediaries (74 percent through regional labor offices 
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to the United States and slightly below the Czech Republic, which had the greatest 
share at 49 percent.  
Unemployment benefits and search costs. Job search theory predicts that unem-
ployment benefits decrease search costs, allow people to search for a job longer and, 
hence, to acquire more information, and lead to higher post-unemployment wages by 
increasing workers’ reservation wages.
16 Figure 4 shows three measures of the unem-
ployment compensation system generosity in OECD countries in our sample: (1) ex-
penditure on unemployment benefits in US PPP$ per one unemployed
17, (2) the unem-
ployment benefits replacement ratio, and (3) the share of unemployment compensation 
in a country’s GDP. The two post-communist transition countries in the sample, the 
Czech Republic and Poland, had the lowest unemployment benefits per unemployed 
person, but this is in part due to their lower per capita incomes, but their replacement 
ratios were relatively low compared to other countries, a fact that should lead to ineffi-
cient wage setting. The ratio of unemployment assistance to GDP measures, in part, the 
coverage and generosity of unemployment benefits, but obviously also depends on the 
level of unemployment.
18 Figure 4 depicts an inverse relationship between all three 
measures of unemployment compensation and wage efficiency. Thus, there seems to be 
no evidence that unemployment benefits in OECD countries or in the transition econo-
mies significantly reduce the costs of acquiring information, extend the length of the job 
search longer, and result in better job matches with higher earnings.
19 We conclude that 
unemployment compensation does not help us shed any light on high wage efficiency in 
the transition economies.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
and 3 percent through private employment agencies), 55 percent used other market search methods (39 
percent contacted employers and 16 percent answered and placed announcements in newspapers), and 0.8 
percent tried to start their own business. The total is greater than 100 percent because each respondent in 
the Polish Labor Force Survey could report up to three job search methods. On average, each person 
reported 1.77 search methods. 
16 However, the link between job search theory and empirical work is rather frail. The most recent em-
pirical research on reservation wages often produces negative coefficients on the unemployment benefits 
variable (Heath and Swann, 1999; Rõõm, 2003; Prasad, 2003). 
17 Data for Finland, Germany, and Ireland are not available. 
18 In Poland, the level of unemployment benefits was uniform for all eligible jobseekers irrespective of 
their previous earnings. Unemployment benefits were reduced from 50 percent of the average national 
wage in 1991 to 36 percent in 1994 and to 21 percent in 2002. In addition, an open-ended unemployment 
benefit system was replaced by a maximum duration of 12 months. Finally, the eligibility rules for access 
to unemployment benefits were tightened, that caused a drastic drop in the proportion of the unemployed 
receiving benefits from 80 percent in 1991 to 50 percent in 1994 to less than 20 percent in 2002 (UN-
ECE, 2003). 
19 Our own calculations for the extensive data set of 38,954 Polish individuals who were unemployed in 
1994-2001 show that unemployment benefits increased the reservation wage by about 0.8 percent; how-
ever, the coefficient is significant (t-statistic=2.035) but small in economic terms. In the sample, 32 per-
cent of the unemployed claimed unemployment benefits as their main source of personal income. 
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5.2 The wage setting system 
The literature suggests the institutions of wage setting also tend to influence the ability 
of workers to obtain a wage that is close to their maximum wage. Among the institu-
tional factors are lower unionization and collective bargaining coverage, less centralized 
bargaining, and the absence of statutory minimum wages all of which tend to increase 
wage dispersion (see the literature review in Card et al., 2007, as well as Koening et al., 
2007 and Baccaro, 2008). Highly dispersed wage distributions are likely to produce 
opaque wage signals to job seekers who will have to acquire and process a greater 
amount of information than under a more compressed wage distribution.  
Trade unions. As Figure 5 shows, in our sample the highest levels of unionization 
were observed in the Scandinavian countries and the lowest level was recorded for the 
United States. Paradoxically, Poland, where trade unions initiated the market reforms in 
the 1980s, now has among the lowest levels of trade union density in Europe but the 
Czech Republic is solidly in the center of the distribution. Thus the relationship be-
tween efficiency and union density does help explain Poland’s good wage efficiency, 
though it does not do so for the Czech Republic  
Employers’ coordination. Employers in Poland are not well organized. According to 
EIRO (2006, pp. 2, 4-5), employers’ organization density in Poland was 20 percent ver-
sus 58 percent in the EU. The most notable associations were the Confederation of Pol-
ish Employers, the Business Center Club, the Polish Confederation of Private Employ-
ers, and the Association of Polish Crafts. The Confederation of Polish Employers was 
the biggest, with about 2 million members; however, it was more interested in acquiring 
political power than in negotiating collective agreements at the sectoral or multi-
establishment level.  
Collective bargaining. Collective bargaining coverage shows the real extent to 
which salaried workers are subject to union-negotiated terms and conditions. The bar-
gaining coverage data presented in Table 2 show that Poland is in the middle of our 
sample and the Czech Republic is at the low end, so this seems not to be a factor that 
explains wage efficiency in the transition economies.  
There are two dimensions to collective bargaining: centralization and coordination. 
Centralization reflects the level where collective contracts are negotiated and formally 
set. In Poland, collective agreements covering a single employer entity continue to be 
the main form of collective bargaining; and sectoral, inter-sectoral or multi-level agree-
ments remain rare. In 1995-2002, the authorities registered 12,094 single-establishment 
agreements and only 157 multi-establishment agreements (EIRO, 2006, p. 5). Table 2 
shows the centralization indicators for our sample for the 1995-2000 interval. Accord-
ing to OECD (2004, p.150), Canada and the United States have historically bargained at 
the company and plant level, the United Kingdom and some Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries, including Poland and the Czech Republic have joined this group more 
recently. At the other extreme, inter-industry bargaining at national level is a feature 
historically characteristic of the Scandinavian countries. Most continental European 
countries traditionally favor “intermediate” forms of wage negotiation, mainly at the 
branch or sectoral level.    Coordination of bargaining reflects the extent to which pay 
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negotiations are coordinated across the economy. In Table 2, the Czech Republic and 
Poland are characterized by the lowest level of coordination, that is, company/plant bar-
gaining with little or no coordination by upper-level associations.  
Minimum wage. The ratio of the minimum wage relative to the median wage of full-
time employees for the Czech Republic and Poland did not differ from those of the 
other countries in our sample (see Table 2). Moreover, there does not seem to be a 
strong relationship between this ratio and wage efficiency. 
Overall, wage setting institutions do not seem to provide an explanation for the 
greater wage efficiency of the two transition economies. In part this is because the two 
transition economies do not differ systematically for the other countries in the sample 
and in part because the relationships between indicators of wage setting mechanisms 
and wage efficiency are not very robust or opposite to what theory predicts. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have used our own and others’ estimates of wage setting efficiency in a 
sample of developed market and transition economies. We find that wage setting effi-
ciency in the transition economies, the Czech Republic and Poland, is higher. We also 
find that this is largely due to socio-economic and environmental factors. In these two 
countries, the labor force is dominated by married males in their prime working years. 
There are few foreign workers, and there is little in-country labor mobility. Moreover, 
strong social bonds lead workers to use informal means of searching for new or higher 
paying jobs. Labor market institutions and policy instruments such as the minimum 
wage or unemployment benefits do not seem to play a major role in wage efficiency.  
While these results seem to suggest that there are some important efficiency benefits 
to the sort of traditional male-dominated and family-oriented societies that the Czech 
Republic and, especially, Poland represent, two important points should be kept in 
mind. The first is that, if our findings are correct, then wage efficiency in the Czech 
Republic and Poland comes at some cost, such as the exclusion of old and young work-
ers and women from the labor force, at least to some extent, as well as the relative ab-
sence of part-time and other flexible working arrangements. The second point is that the 
socio-economic features that appear to bestow such high efficiency in wage setting on 
the Czech Republic and Poland are unlikely to last. Their populations are ageing, which 
means that immigrants will account for a larger share of the labor force, and flexible 
arrangements for young and old workers and women will have to be provided. More-
over, as production shifts from industry to services, women can also be expected to play 
a larger role. Last, but not least, rising incomes and influences from the more advances 
countries are likely to produce social changes in the Czech Republic and Poland that 
will move society away from sort of traditional nuclear families, lack of mobility, and 
strong local social ties that characterize the two post-communist countries now and that 
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Appendix 
Figure 1:   Wage efficiency and demographic characteristics of the labor force 
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Figure 2:   Wage efficiency and environmental factors 
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Figure 4:   Wage efficiency and unemployment benefits  
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  21Table 1:   Variable means and maximum likelihood estimates of the wage frontier coefficients:           
  International comparison, Polachek and Xiang (2006) specification 
Variable means  Regression estimates 













Woman  Wage 
inefficiency ratio 
Canada 2000  13.288  18.450  0.487  0.098 -0.006  0.0002  -0.314  0.340 
Czech R.  1996  10.413  23.784  0.466  0.093 0.020  -0.0003  -0.321  0.274 
Finland 2000  11.693  22.208  0.491  0.065 0.043  -0.0005  -0.421  0.563 
Germany 2000  12.607  27.399  0.516  0.105 0.020  -0.0002  -0.187  0.357 
Ireland  1996 9.492  29.905  0.495 0.091 0.038  -0.0004  -0.110  0.353 
Israel 1997  12.019  22.691  0.514  0.128 0.042  -0.0005  -0.514  0.341 
Netherlands 1999  12.693  19.441  0.463  0.065 0.026  -0.0003  -0.058  0.297 
Norway 2000  12.734  20.755  0.486  0.073 0.046  -0.0008  -0.460  0.484 
Sweden 2000  12.207  22.140  0.491  0.092 0.036  -0.0005  -0.392  0.471 
UK 1995  11.094  22.043  0.504  0.161  0.018 -0.0001  -0.368  0.204 
US 2000  12.818  25.219  0.521  0.116  0.027 -0.0003  -0.307  0.384 
                
Poland: 2001  11.985  20.750  0.445           
coefficient       0.085  0.018  -0.0002  -0.231  0.109 
std.  error       (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.0000)  (0.007)  
λ = 0.464 (std.err. 0.080) 
σ = 0.345 (std.err. 0.005) 
2
v σ = 0.098
2
u σ = 0.021
N obs.= 9380 
Source: Authors’ computations for Poland. For other countries - Polachek and Xiang (2006), Tables 1 and 2. Polachek and Xiang estimated wage frontier 







































































































 Table 2:   Labor  market  characteristics  in  OECD  countries         









of the adult 
population 
20 to 40 
years of age 
(iii) 
Prime age 











% of the 
labor force 
25 to 64 




















(A)  (B) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Canada (CAN)  2000  54.0  41.8 (2001)  74.1  84 (1999)  79.4  28.1  22.5  18.1 
Czech R. (CZE)  1996  55.9  53.6 (2002) 75.4 90  (1998)  74.7 (1995)  46.3 (1995)  42.0  4.3 (1998) 
Finland (FIN)  2000  52.4  36.5 (2002)  77.5  76 (1999)  61.6  75.0  27.6  2.6 
Germany (DEU)  2000  55.9  44.6 (2002)  75.9  85 (1999)  87.5  25.0  33.7  12.5 
Ireland (IRE)  1996  61.1  41.7 (2002)  71.2  58 (1998)  57.9 (1995)  45.5  27.8  6.9 
Netherlands (NLD)  1999  57.3  53.7 (2002)  76.1  72  64.3 (2000)  24.6  21.4  9.8 
Norway (NOR)  2000  52.9  32.1 (2002)  73.0  88  75.8  53.7  21.9  6.8 
Poland (POL)  2001  54.9  57.7 (2002)  81.5  86  61.7 (2000)  14.7  30.5  1.6 (2002) 
Sweden (SWE)  2000  52.1  28.0 (2002)  72.6  80 (1999)  83.3  79.1  24.6  11.3 
UK (GBR)  1995  54.5  38.8 (2002)  72.6  85 (1998)  88.7  32.6  27.3  6.9 
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% of those 




























(A)  (B)  (9)  (10) (11) (13) (12) (14) 
Canada (CAN)  2000  1.11 (1998)  37 (2001)  5.3 (1997)  0.49 (1999)  0.78  0.41 (2003) 
Czech R. (CZE)  1996  0.77 (2003)  49 (2001)  1.1 (1997)  0.24 (1998) 0.30  (1999) 0.37  (2003) 
Finland (FIN)  2000  ..  25 (2001)  ..  0.54 (1999)  1.65  .. 
Germany (DEU)  2000  1.15 (1998)  ..  ..  0.37 (1999)  1.88  .. 
Ireland (IRE)  1996  ..  32 (2001)  ..  0.35 (1999)  0.63 (2001)  0.38 (2003) 
Netherlands (NLD)  1999  2.15  ..  13.6 (1997)  0.70  2.30  0.51 (2003) 
Norway (NOR)  2000  ..  29 (2001)  9.3 (1997)  0.62 (1999)  4.46  .. 
Poland (POL)  2001  0.30 (2003)  46  2.3 (1997)  0.36 (1998)  1.01  0.40 (2003) 
Sweden (SWE)  2000  ..  ..  9.0 (1997)  0.74 (1999)  1.27  .. 
UK (GBR)  1995  2.60 (1999)  33 (2001)  5.0 (1997)  0.17 (1999)  0.63 (1998)  0.44 (2003) 
US (USA)  2000  2.69 (1998)  46 (2001)  3.2 (1997)  0.29 (1999)  0.23  0.32 (2003) 
Notes: Data not available. 
(xiii) Source: Figure EQ2.2 on p. 71 in the Society at a Glance: OECD Social Indicators 2006 Edition, OECD, 2007. There is no national minimum wage in 





















































































































Annual average earnings 
dispersion, 90-10 percentile 
ratios for the gross earnings 
of full-time employees (xvii) 
(A) (B)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19) 
Canada (CAN)  2000  32.0  1    (1995-00)  1    (1995-00)  4  3.65 (1995-99) 
Czech R. (CZE)  1996 
25.0+ 
(2000)  1    (1995-00)  1    (1995-00)  ..  2.86 (1995-99) 
Finland (FIN)  2000  90.0+  5    (1995-00)  5    (1995-00)  4  2.36 (1995-99) 
Germany (DEU)  2000  68.0  3    (1995-00)  4    (1995-00)  4  2.87 (1995-99) 
Ireland (IRE)  1996  ..  4    (1995-00)  4    (1995-00)  1 (2000)  3.97 (1995-99) 
Netherlands (NLD)  1999 
80.0+ 
(2000)  3    (1995-00)  4    (1995-00)  3 (2000)  2.85 (1995-99) 
Norway (NOR)  2000  70.0+  4.5  (1995-00)  4.5  (1995-00)  4  1.96 (1995-99) 
Poland (POL)  2001 
40.0+ 
(2000)  1    (1995-00)  1    (1995-00)  ..  3.50 (1995-99) 
Sweden (SWE)  2000  90.0+  3    (1995-00)  3    (1995-00)  4  2.23 (1995-99) 
UK (GBR)  1995 
30.0+ 
(2000)  1    (1995-00)  1    (1995-00)  1 (2000)  3.45 (1995-99) 











































(xiv) Source: Table 3.3 on p. 145 in the OECD Employment Outlook 2004. Figures with a + sign represent lower-bound estimates. For the purpose of 
calculating different estimates, OECD increased the indicated value by 2.5 percentage points.  
(xv) Source: Table 3.5 on p. 151 in the OECD Employment Outlook 2004. The centralization indicator has a 1-4 (lowest to highest) scale; and the coordination 
indicator has a 1-5 (lowest to highest) scale. 
(xvi) Source: Box 3.3 on p. 152 in the OECD Employment Outlook 2004. The governability indicator has a 1-4 (lowest to highest) scale reflecting the ability of 
the employer and trade union associations to control the behavior of their constituency or “rank and file.” 
(xvii) Source: Table 3.2 on p. 141 in the OECD Employment Outlook 2004. 
Notes: Data not available. 
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